The dream of an ambitious railway network connecting member-states, from bustling coastline cities to inland hubs, has always been part of a grand design for interconnectivity within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) space.
After decades of plans and promises, however, the tracks remain largely unbuilt. Financial constraints, technical snags, and a recent political fracture, the departure of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in January, have brought the project to an almost complete halt.
The vision is ambitious. The picture of a coastal line linking West Africa’s economic powerhouses together has spurred public interest. Major projects that are part of extensive national efforts and regional collaboration that would eventually integrate rail transport network across the sub region include Nigeria’s Coastal Railway, an $11.7 billion project to connect Lagos to Calabar, one of the largest in West Africa, and the Ghana-Burkina Faso Railway, a proposed 1,000-km rail link to connect Tema port to Ouagadougou, with feasibility studies funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB), with an estimated cost projected at $3 to 5 billion.
Another key stretch, a $4 billion line from Niger to Benin, referred to as the Bénirail project, aims to rehabilitate the existing metre-gauge Cotonou–Parakou line in Benin and extend it approximately 574 km to Niamey. It would give landlocked Sahel countries a direct path to ports. The goal is cheaper shipping – freight costs in the subregion are double the global average at $0.08 per kilometer per ton, faster travel, and less dependence on overcrowded, costly roads.
Progress, however, is grindingly slow. Feasibility studies for a 530-kilometer railway in Ghana from Aflao to Elubo were supposed to have been done by 2019, but there is little to show for it currently. The Niger-Benin line, backed by a private company under a build-and-operate deal, has seen some repairs, but deadlines keep slipping. A grander 18,000-kilometer Pan-African railway plan, which includes ECOWAS nations like Senegal and Mali, remains just sketches on paper. As one ECOWAS transport report puts it, the railway gets plenty of applause but precious little action.
January 29, was a major setback, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger walked away from ECOWAS, forming their own alliance, the AES. Frustrated by sanctions after military coups and what they saw as ECOWAS’s faltering leadership, these landlocked nations were vital for connecting the Sahel to coastal ports. Their exit throws cross-border plans into chaos and raises questions about their future in the railway project.
ECOWAS has given a six-month window, until July, to keep trade moving, but the damage is deep. Some reports suggest that these countries are now looking to Russia for partnerships, which could pull resources away from ECOWAS projects. The AES exit exacerbates ECOWAS’s infrastructure hopes, especially as the AES has announced its own Railway Development Roadmap to expand rail networks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, including the Niamey–Bamako Highway Project, which may include rail components.
This political situation worsens other troubles. Recent coups in these Sahel states, combined with ECOWAS’s inconsistent stance, punishing military takeovers but turning a blind eye to leaders who employ constitutional manipulation to hold on to power, have eroded trust. Security threats, from Sahel terrorism to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, make investors nervous and disrupt planning. The railway, which needs seamless regional teamwork, is caught in the middle.
Money is another major hurdle for the grand scheme. The coastal route and Niger-Benin line alone demand billions, far beyond ECOWAS’s budget. Private investors are wary. Political instability and slim short-term profits scare most of them off. Only a few, like Bolloré working on the Niger-Benin line, have stepped up. The AES split makes things worse, as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger now face higher costs to reach ports, which potentially diverts their funds elsewhere. Creative financing, like build-and-operate deals, won’t work without stable conditions, as a 2020 ResearchGate study points out.
There is also the technical side. West Africa’s 10,188 kilometers of railways are mostly old, single-track lines built for freight, with creaky trains and outdated signals. Different track widths, some 1,067 millimeters, others 1,000, mean trains can not easily cross borders without costly upgrades.
Plans for modern, standard-gauge tracks, like the Lagos-to-Accra line, exist but have not received financial support. Poor management and patchy data on transport needs do not help. These challenges, paired with the project’s massive price tag, make it a hard pitch to funders. Some lines, however, are being modernised or newly built. An example is Nigeria’s Abuja–Kaduna standard-gauge line, completed in 2016,
The promise of a subregional rail network remains possible. With the benefits of big African goals like the AfCFTA and the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, it could transform trade by cutting shipping times and costs, boosting industries like mining and farming.
Trains are also more environmentally friendly than trucks, though ideas for electric trains are still in early stages. The prospect of jobs and economic growth keeps the project alive in West Africa’s imagination. Private companies like Bolloré and broader visions like the Pan-African railway show there is interest, even if it’s mostly talk for now.
ECOWAS’s push for public-private partnerships, laid out in its 2020 Transport Program, could draw more players if risks ease. Global partners, like the African Development Bank or even China and the EU, might bring funds and expertise, as several analysts have predicted.
To get the railway moving, ECOWAS needs to act fast, some analysts say. It must find new funding, leaning on institutions like the African Development Bank and expanding private deals for key routes like Lagos-to-Abidjan or Niger-Benin, they propose. Standardising track widths and upgrading signals would let trains cross borders smoothly.
Regional treaty bodies also recommend that ECOWAS use the six-month grace period to negotiate with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, keeping them tied to rail plans. A regional rail authority could streamline planning and fill management gaps. Exploring electric trains and digital systems could make the network greener and more efficient.
The Trans-West African Railway remains a bright vision for a region craving connection. But political divides, funding shortages, and aging infrastructure have left it stalled. Its link to Africa’s trade ambitions and sparks of private interest offer hope, but ECOWAS must bridge its divides, secure funds, and modernise tracks to make it real. Without decisive steps, this dream may just remain on the drawing board, leaving West Africa’s economic future waiting at the station.
