By Henry Konneh
Across the Sahel, a semi-arid belt stretching from Senegal to Sudan, millions face daily struggles against the devastating effects of climate change. Homelands have been turned into battlegrounds, where shrinking resources set communities against each other and extremist groups exploit the chaos for their own gain.
The region today is caught in an endless loop of climate shocks, resource conflicts, and extremist violence. according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the vast region is warming at 1.5 times the global average, with temperatures projected to rise 2–4.3°C by 2080. Crippling droughts, and unpredictable rainfall patterns, sometimes resulting in devastating floods, have disrupted agriculture and pastoralism, the region’s economic backbone.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reports that Niger alone loses 100,000 to 120,000 hectares of arable land annually to desertification. At the same time, water scarcity has become a weapon of war. Violent extremist organisations like Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) have been known to destroy water infrastructure to control access, with attacks on water points increasing 40% between 2019 and 2024, per the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
These environmental indicators have made long-standing tensions between pastoralists and farmers worse. Historically, the two groups shared resources through customary agreements, allowing herders to graze cattle on fallow fields in exchange for manure to enrich the soil.
Climate change has overturned this balance. “The seasons are unpredictable now,” says Ibrahim, a farmer in Burkina Faso. “We plant, but the rains don’t come, or they come too late. When herders cross our fields, there is nothing left to spare.” Agricultural expansion has further blocked traditional grazing routes, forcing herders into farmlands and sparking violent clashes.
Fighting for limited land resources
In Mali, these disputes often take on ethnic dimensions, particularly in central regions like Mopti where Fulani herders, many of whom are nomadic or semi-nomadic, encroach into areas used by sedentary farmers, including Dogon communities, pitting the herders against Dogon farmers. The International Crisis Group notes that such conflicts have killed thousands since 2016.
The consequences are also being felt south of the Sahel. In Nigeria, Fulani herdsmen, driven southward by dwindling grazing lands, have increasingly encroached on farmlands. Their cattle frequently trample and consume crops, leading to violent confrontations with local farmers.
This tension has been especially deadly in the country’s central states of Benue, Plateau and Taraba, in Nigeria’s rich agricultural belt, where reports from sources like the International Crisis Group and local Nigerian news outlets like Vanguard and The Guardian confirm that clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers have resulted in hundreds of deaths in recent years.
The Nigerian situation is complex, however. Some argue that the conflicts are not solely about land but also involve ethnic, religious, and political dimensions, with both sides implicated in violence.
Across the Sahel, encompassing countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania, extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Boko Haram, exploit local grievances to establish control. These grievances are often the result of weak governance, poverty, marginalisation, and intercommunal conflicts over resources like land and water.
As central governments in the region struggle with limited resources, corruption, and vast ungoverned territories, they leave rural populations vulnerable. Extremist groups capitalise on this vacuum, offering protection, basic services, or ideological purpose to disenfranchised communities, particularly young men. In northern Mali, for example, jihadists have provided food, water, and even dispute-resolution mechanisms to gain local support, as noted in reports by the International Crisis Group.
In Niger, groups like ISGS exploit tensions between herders and farmers, presenting themselves as arbiters and providers. “They came to our village with food and water,” recalls Moussa, a 22-year-old from Niger who briefly joined JNIM. “The government does nothing for us. These men promised protection and a future.”
A 2023 UNDP report, “Journey to Extremism in Africa,” found that 25% of voluntary recruits in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Mali, cited job opportunities as their primary reason for joining extremist groups, a 92% increase from 2017 findings. By destroying water infrastructure and monopolising access, groups like IS-Sahel reinforce their control.
Boubacar Ba, Director of the Centre d’Analyse sur la Gouvernance et la Sécurité au Sahel (CAGSS), speaking in 2021, said “Water is a vital entry point for peacebuilding in the Inner Niger Delta, where competition over scarce resources fuels conflict. Those who dominate water access, including armed groups, hold sway over communities’ survival and loyalty.”
The shrinking of Lake Chad, once a lifeline for fishing and farming communities, vividly illustrates the origins and impact of the crisis. Since the 1960s, the lake has lost 90% of its surface area, as shown by NASA data, pushing millions into poverty. “My father caught fish every day,” says 29-year-old Gaji from Chad’s lake region. “Now there’s nothing. People join Boko Haram because they’re hungry.” Just as she says, the group has capitalised on this desperation, recruiting displaced youth and attacking rival communities to dominate what remains of the lake’s resources.
Consequences of a colonial template
Climate change is only a part of the story. Structural governance failures, rooted in colonial legacies and post-independence neglect, are major instigators of conflicts in the region. French and British colonial administrations divided the Sahel into “useful” zones for agriculture and “useless” pastoralist regions, sowing seeds of marginalisation that would come back to haunt the inhabitants. “The borders they drew ignored our way of life,” says Tuareg elder in Mali. “They favoured farmers, and governments still do.”
Post-independence policies have entrenched this bias. In Mali, land tenure laws have systematically disadvantaged herders, contributing to Tuareg rebellions since the 1960s. In Mali, the 1968 Land Tenure Law prioritised sedentary farmers by granting formal land titles to agricultural communities, while largely ignoring the customary grazing rights of nomadic Tuareg herders.
This policy marginalised pastoralists, restricted their access to traditional grazing lands, and fuelled resentment, contributing to the outbreak of the first Tuareg rebellion between 1963 and 1964, as herders sought to resist state-backed encroachment on their livelihoods. The Sahel has seen 18 coups since then, each further eroding trust in governance.
Corruption exacerbates the problem. In 2020, Mali’s government, facing allegations of corruption insurgencies, economic challenges, and public distrust, witnessed widespread protests in Bamako. “People were starving, and they did not care. They fed themselves,” says a local activist. “No wonder some turn to rebels.” Such failures fuel anti-state narratives, which these extremist groups exploit to undermine public trust. People have spoken of videos, not independently verified in which JNIM propagandists declare “The government can’t protect you from drought or bandits, we can.”
Finding lasting solutions
The human toll of this climate change scourge is staggering. Over 16 million people in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger need humanitarian aid, with internal displacement soaring 2,400% since 2014, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Women and children bear the brunt. “I fled my village after an attack,” says Safiatou, a 40-year-old mother of six in Burkina Faso. “We walked for days. Now we have nothing, no home, no food.” Aid agencies struggle to keep up, hampered by insecurity and funding shortfalls.
There are local efforts to break the cycle, but progress is uneven. the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), established in 1973, has supported initiatives like reforestation, soil and water conservation (SWC), and climate-smart crop varieties, directly addressing the Sahel’s warming and erratic rainfall, a report says.
The report adds that in Burkina Faso, CILSS-backed SWC techniques increased biomass production by 2005, countering desertification. In Niger, farmer-managed natural regeneration (FMNR) restored 5 million hectares of degraded land, boosting yields and resilience.
“You can’t fight terrorism without addressing drought and hunger,” says one analyst. The ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol, designed to regulate herder movements, needs reform to prioritise coordination over control. “Pastoralists are not criminals. They need mobility to survive,” argues a consultant on migration in the Sahel.
The Great Green Wall, an ambitious reforestation project launched in 2007, aims to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land by 2030. But funding gaps have slowed its advance, with 20 to 30% of the goal achieved by 2024, according to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification.
“Moringa has commercial value and supports many families. It has really changed the lives of the growers. It is also important to create these cooperatives because the production of moringa fits perfectly with the restoration of the land,” Salamatou Souley, the mayor of Kollo, a town in Niger, said in a UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reports.
Local solutions show promise. Reviving traditional mediation systems could ease farmer-herder disputes, while land tenure reforms balancing both groups’ needs might reduce tensions. Investments in climate-smart agriculture, drought-resistant crops, efficient irrigation, could also lessen resource competition, some reports have suggested.
Deepening vulnerabilities
Climate change is a threat multiplier, according to a 2021 UN Security Council briefing by António Guterres. It has deepened the Sahel’s vulnerabilities. Experts agree, but they say while climate change makes everything worse, it is not the root cause. Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, a Sahel expert at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, argues that the Sahel’s crises are deeply interconnected, with climate change as one of many aggravating factors rather than the sole driver.
Sardan has also asserted that environmental fixes alone, without addressing governance failures, corruption, and ethnic divisions, will fall short. Immediate humanitarian needs, such as food aid, and shelter for the displaced, must be met alongside long-term reforms, from equitable land policies to climate adaptation funding.
The Sahel’s crises are not confined to its borders. Instability has already spread to the littoral states in West Africa, with JNIM expanding into Benin and Togo. For instance, JNIM claimed responsibility for three attacks in Benin and four in Togo in 2024, including a deadly assault in northern Benin on January 8, 2025, which killed 28 Beninese soldiers.
If this continues unchecked, security experts have warned, the region could become a global security flashpoint. in a July 2024 UN Security Council briefing, UN Special Representative for the Sahel, Leonardo Simão described the sub-region as marked by “growing insecurity, worsening humanitarian crises, and a lack of strong cooperation between States.” During a September 2024 visit to Benin, he stressed the need for regional cooperation to curb insecurity and instability. For millions struggling to cope with the emerging realities in the region, the stakes are personal, and a lasting solution is all they seek.
