Ghana’s president, John Dramani Mahama, concluded his official five-day tour of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the three military-led countries that make up the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), where he held talks with the leaders on topics ranging from stronger economic ties to security cooperation. The diplomatic tour is aimed at strengthening relations between Ghana and the three Sahel countries.
Mahama’s first stop was Bamako, the Malian capital, where he met with the country’s military ruler, Colonel Assimi Goïta. Their talks focused on strengthening ties, addressing security challenges and economic development.


Mahama’s next stop after Mali was Niger, where he was received by the head of the country’s military junta, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, at the airport in the presence of members of the National Defense Council, the Government, the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, religious leaders and representatives of the Ghanaian community residing in Niger
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, was the final leg of the trip, where the country’s popular leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, welcomed him. Mahama was accorded military honours, also receiving the traditional Saponé hat from Captain Traoré, reinforcing the close personal friendship between both leaders.
The two leaders met privately in the VIP lounge before heading to the Koulouba Presidential Palace, where the discussions centred on strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries, the security situation in the Sahel, as well as sub-regional and international geopolitics.
Ghana, under Mahama, is strategically engaging with the AES to secure economic and security cooperation, potentially bridging the current divide between the littoral states and the military-led countries of the Sahel, and raising fears that the country may be shifting from the ECOWAS position on relations with the three states
Ghana’s interests include opening a corridor for Mali to import goods via Ghana’s ports, and joint efforts against terrorism, acknowledging its impact on both Ghana and the Sahel.
Mahama navigates a delicate balance with his diplomatic efforts, maintaining Ghana’s ECOWAS membership while fostering relations with the AES. He had reportedly stated, while speaking in Bamako, that ECOWAS must respect the AES’s decision to leave and that both entities can work together without formal integration.
However, on a recent visit to Abidjan, he had offered to be a bridge between ECOWAS and the AES to “see how we can work with them so that they not only remain within our sub region but also do the transition to constitutional democracy.”
His remarks and diplomatic overtures, some say, appear contradictory. However, several commentators say they rather reflect Ghana’s pragmatic approach to regional stability and economic opportunities, avoiding what many observers have described as the hard-line ECOWAS stance, championed by Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire, which alienated the AES.
Mahama shows his unique approach to geopolitics, embarking on subtle diplomacy that clearly distinguishes between playing politics and doing business. He appears to be building trust that appear to have been eroded between the AES leadership and ECOWAS.
Noting that trust was a key challenge in the row between the Sahel states and the regional organisation, Mahama, during a press briefing after discussions with Traoré, said “We discussed the issue of AES and ECOWAS and I’ve got new perspectives about the concerns that the three countries have in respect of their relations with ECOWAS. I have assured Mr President (Traoré) that the next meeting of ECOWAS, I would pass on what they have explained to me to the other leaders.”
Ghana’s position reflects a broader trend of West African states navigating competing regional blocs and geopolitical alignments in 2025, a situation made even more complex by the eventual exit of the three Sahel states from ECOWAS in January 2025.
After announcing their withdrawal from the regional organisation in January 2024, citing its lack of support against jihadist threats, “inhuman” sanctions after the coups, and perceived Western (especially French) influence in the bloc, the new Sahel alliance, which has recently evolved into a Confederation, has emphasised its independence from regional and international bodies, focusing on collective defence, sovereignty, and regional integration among themselves. They have rejected returning to ECOWAS or adhering to its demands for a “return to constitutional order”, insisting that they would determine the timeline for that process.
A major economic setback for the AES member-states is their status as landlocked countries, relying heavily on regional trade networks for the sale of livestock and goods that require coastal ports for export. This is where Ghana’s engagement with the AES could position it to capture economic benefits missed by other ECOWAS members, such as Benin Republic, which lost a large percentage of Niger’s imports after sanctions.
Mahama wants a slice of that pie. His visit could open a corridor for imports to Mali. For now, all three countries are mainly using the port of Lomé in Togo and Ghana aims to key in to the immense potentials for expanding export routes. Mahama is also focusing on building alliances in the fight against terrorism, which he says is a battle that the entire region must work together to eradicate.
The visit to Burkina Faso included discussions with Traoré on launching a daily flight between Accra and Ouagadougou, and exploring a gas pipeline to boost trade and energy cooperation between Ghana and Burkina Faso.
The pipeline is a strategic initiative to enhance energy and economic ties. It aims to supply natural gas from Ghana to Burkina Faso, leveraging Ghana’s gas resources to support Burkina Faso’s development by helping it access a reliable energy source for electricity generation and industrial development, while also boosting Ghana’s role as an energy hub in the region, a report on the project says.
Currently, the Ghana-Burkina Faso gas pipeline is in the planning or discussion phase, with no specific details on its construction timeline, route, or capacity provided. However, it aligns with Mahama’s broader strategy to strengthen economic ties with the AES countries.
Ghana has existing natural gas infrastructure, including the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) operated by the West African Gas Pipeline Company (WAPCo), which transports gas from Nigeria through Benin, Togo, and Ghana. Energy experts say the proposed pipeline to Burkina Faso could potentially build on or connect to this network, extending gas supply northward to Ouagadougou.
For Burkina Faso, access to natural gas would reduce reliance on expensive imported fuels, lower electricity costs, and support industrial growth, addressing energy deprivation in the landlocked country.
For Ghana, exporting gas would diversify revenue streams, strengthen economic ties with AES countries, and position Ghana as a regional energy leader, especially after ECOWAS tensions.
Mahama’s diplomatic engagement also reveals a more strategic intent. Successfully brokering a resolution will enhance Ghana’s diplomatic influence as a regional power-broker, establishing itself as an alternative to Nigeria’s and other member-states’ firm position against the military juntas. Mahama has already established himself as a neutral and trusted peace broker, strengthening his, and Ghana’s, reputation as a respected mediator in the sub-region.











