Risky Game .
The tasks given to Gbedemah by the Americans were much more complicated. He had to cause economic and political chaos in the country using the support of the opposition, including the United Busia Party, and prepared an anti-government plot with the view of establishing a regime in Ghana that would pave the way for American business interests.
Gbedemah realised that that was a very risky deal. He did not doubt that the coup would be a success counting on all-mighty Washington. He also took into consideration that after the victory over Nkrumah he would have to fight Busia who, naturally, would aspire to the role of Ghana’s dictator. That would certainly entail a clash with the British who could cause much trouble after finding out that their graduate managed to secretly graduate from another school and completely forget his first teachers.
To whip up Gbedemah, Washington gave him to understand that in case the coup was successful Gbedemah would be given support to spread his power over the neighbouring Togo and Nigeria which eventually would secure him an outstanding position in the entire Pan-African movement. From this it followed that he, Gbedemah, could become one of the principal creatures of the Americans in Africa and as such would make other African leaders count with his recommendations. This prospect inflamed Gbedemah’s ambitions, especially because together with power it promised money too. The Americans hurried Gbedemah saying that any delay was dangerous since the moment for a coup might be lost.
In July, 1961 Gbedemah was asked to come to the U.S. Officially this trip was explained by the necessity of finishing negotiations on the American financing of the Volta project. However, the main subject of talks with Gbedemah in Washington was the thorough elaboration of all details of the coup, which was to take place during Nkrumah’s trip to Eastern Europe. To implement that plan the United Busia Party as well as people recruited by the C.I.A. agents, who worked as clerks in American firms and representations in Ghana, had to be brought into play.
It was assumed that the moment the agents instigate disorders in the country and start attacks against Nkrumah, Gbedemah would address the people with an appeal for law and order and would declare the creation of a new government, with opposition leaders in the key posts. The political programme for the new regime drawn up in Washington included a number of demagogic promises to Ghana’s population, an amnesty to all prisoners, the unlimited freedom of private enterprise, etc.
Gbedemah was given assurances that at least two of Ghana’s neighbours, Togo and Liberia, would immediately recognise the new government. Simultaneously, a campaign would start in the West in support of Gbedemah’s regime. The final touch: a report from Washington announcing the signature of the agreement for financing the Voila project. The September strikes in Ghana, the activisation of the opposition and the increasing differences between the leaders of the Convention People’s Party proved the first stage of this master plan.
As a member of the Presidential Commission which executed the functions of Ghana’s President when Nkrumah was away, Gbedemah was lying low in expectation of the United Party’s actions so as to make short work of the principal supporters of Nkrumah and then declare himself head of the new government. As everyone knows this has not come to pass.
‘Pie Conspiracy Fails
The main mistakes made by Gbedemah and his patrons which led to the fiasco of the planned coup d’etat were their underestimation of the influence and popularity of Dr. Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party among the Ghanaian population, and an overestimation of the possibilities and power of the opposition.
Very often the nature of the cult of Nkrumah and “Nkrumaism” in Ghana are misinterpreted abroad. Frequently this cult is pictured as the deification of the dictator forced upon the people. In reality one has to spend but a few days in Ghana to become convinced that it is the people of that country, true to their DEC 1964 national traditions, who put the Osagyefo on a pedestal and took an oath of allegiance and loyalty to him.
Explanation must be sought not only in the personal qualities of Dr. Nkrumah as a man but mainly in the successes scored by Ghana under his leadership. In 1961, Ghana demonstrated that she can develop independently and not only without guidance on the part of the Europeans but even in conditions of imperialist resistance.
The “Ghanaisation” of the state apparatus and the army has been carried out in the country. Great changes were carried out in Ghana’s economy as a result of nationalising a number of large enterprises engaged in the mining of gold and diamonds, foreign trade, the purchasing of agricultural products, etc. The living standards of the population showed a steep rise and proved the highest in tropical Africa. Measures taken by the government to create the state sector of the economy and restrictions put on foreign capital provided opportunities for starting planned development of the country.
The country’s constitution introduced by the British was revised. Parliament began to play an active role. Of special interest in Ghana is the establishment of the Auditor-General’s Office. The Auditor-General enjoys complete independence and controls the entire financial activities of governmental institutions. The reports of the Auditor-General, very often critical of ministers and government departments, are published regularly. All these measures ensured popularity for Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party, the latter doubling the number of members from one to two million people in 1960-1961.
By that time opposition had no serious support of the masses to speak of. It was backed in Ghana solely by Nkrumah’s personal enemies who were striving for power and enrichment, as well as by heads of some tribes who sacrificed the general interests of the nation for clannish ones. The majority of the opposition leaders enjoyed the notoriety of speculators, dishonest businessmen and intriguers.
The well-planned and thoroughly prepared campaign of strikes and riots in Ghana did not yield the desired results. The actions of the restricted group of plotters were not supported by the entire population of Ghana. Gbedemah saved his skin because he did not take the decisive step. As a result the only thing he brought upon himself was Nkrumah’s admonitions and accusation of passivity and shilly-shallying during the height of disorders. All this undermined Gbedemah’s position. Besides, he had all grounds to believe that in the long run the Ghanaian security services would reach him too.
He felt that he was losing ground and that the best move now would be to flee from Ghana. Gbedemah’s friends in Washington also arrived at the conclusion that his further stay in Accra was not only dangerous but also quite inadvisable. The failure of the coup only served to strengthen Nkrumah’s regime and made conditions very difficult for the opposition and foreign agents. It was, therefore, decided to make Gbedemah leader of the opposition in ” voluntary exile ” and entrust him with organising campaigns of slander so as to compromise Nkrumah, as well as with preparing another plot, aimed at assassinating Nkrumah and at changing the regime in Ghana.
The Americans recommended. that Gbedemah act in close contact with Busia so as to use the United Party for the preparation of the coup, and that he try and rally all opposition forces. Special agents in U.S. higher educational establishments as well as in those of Europe started working on the Ghanaian students abroad with the view of winning them over to the side of the conspirators.
Certain African leaders who resented the popularity of Nkrumah in Africa were also to be used in the campaign of compromising Ghana’s President. On September 29, 1961 in compliance with instructions, Gbedemah gave his consent to resignation, which Nkrumah suggested he should hand in, and declared that from then on he would continue his political activities as a private person.
