Ouattara’s contradicting stance on Gabon and the Sahel raise many questions, say analysts.

The recent meeting between Ivorian president, Allasan Ouattara, and the head of the Gabonese military junta, Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, on the side-lines of the Saudi Arabia – Africa Summit, has stirred mixed reactions from political commentators across West Africa.

It is of note that President Ouattara, who vehemently condemned the coups d’état in the Sahel and insisted that he would not recognise any of the military juntas, has contradicted himself by receiving a leader who assumed leadership through a coup d’état.

Many observers are asking what makes Nguema’s coup d’état in Gabon acceptable while same actions in the Sahel are considered a threat to democracy, so much so  that Ouattara has vehemently pushed for both military action and strangulating sanctions that have deprived the population of a country like Niger basic needs.

For many, Ouattara’s reception for Nguema indicates a deep-seated plot by his government to serve the interests of the French government and not the defence of democracy as he and other West African leaders have claimed. This is even more evident, commentators say, as General Nguema’s speech suggests that his government had been receiving valuable advice from Ouattara.

According to Nguema, “We came here to benefit from his advices, President Ouattara, being a long-time friend of Gabon… So, we have benefited from his advices, on how to make this transition successful, and to help us. We also count on the support of President Ouattara who is a big brother, and who is a long-time friend of Gabon, so that he can also make use of his political clout, particularly on the international scene, so that Gabon can be appeased from its sanctions.”

An issue that his critics have pointed to is the fact that Ouattara and other presidents have rejected growing calls among many for an end to the sanctions against Niger due to the devastating effects of the sanctions on the country, as well as the return of Mali and Burkina Faso back into ECOWAS.

As one source put it, “what is good for the goose is good for the gander. You cannot tell me that the actions of ECOWAS, strongly advocated by Ouattara, in its staunch rejection of military coups d’état in the sub region is acceptable when you turn around and open your arms to welcome same intervention in another African state. This is unacceptable.”

There are different opinions on the reasons for Ouattara’s acceptance of the Gabonese leader, but none appears to be based on any rational distinction between the intervention in Gabon and those in the Sahel, except, as some commentators have insisted, the fact that Cote D’Ivoire is mirroring France’s political endorsements on the continent.

France’s muted response to the Gabonese coup contradicts its outright rejection of same actions in the Sahel, pundits say, because the military leadership in the Sahel do not align with France’s intrusive political influence in the sub region. They say the new Gabonese military leadership has not indicated that it shares same sentiments and has maintained all longstanding ties.

There are indications that Ouattara’s position on the use of military action by ECOWAS to remove the military junta in Niger has eased considerably. However, many still believe his initial insistence was understandably driven by a fear of the possible chain reaction that the coups could have sparked, and the potential dangers for his government.

Political watchers say Ouattara’s decision to meet with the Gabonese military leader, while pushing for a harder stance against the military leaders in the Sahel, poses a real threat to efforts at negotiating a return to the regional body by the Sahelian states and also presents the regional body as serving western hegemonic interests.

This reality is even more unsettling with reports of a meeting between the leaders of the three states under the auspices of the Alliance of Sahelian States (ASS; French: l’Alliance des États du Sahel; AES) in Bamako, the Malian capital, which, sources say, may be in anticipation of possible ECOWAS sanctions in January 2024.

Reports also echo a possible, even probable, exit of the AES countries from ECOWAS in the event of sanctions, a development that would be a major blow to what has been considered Africa’s most resilient attempts at integration.