Niger: The ECOWAS crusade and a coup with many faces.

1. By Ejiroghene Barrett

As the defence chiefs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member-states gather in Accra, the Ghanaian capital, to re-evaluate their strategies for a military intervention in Niger, citizens of the country continue to protest against any threat of such action, demanding that the coup d’état provides a genuine opportunity to detach themselves from the hawkish grip of French hegemony.

These protests do not paint a complete picture of the current political conundrum in the country, however, and several reports highlight the many political challenges that the military junta may have exploited to sell itself as a liberator.

The decision of ECOWAS to activate its military force to reinstate the democratic government of Mohamed Bazoum comes with many implications. Political pundits have warned that, as principled as it appears, there are elements that could ignite a greater crisis if the member states do not apply caution in what seems like a desperate attempt to preserve a withering and unpopular political arrangement.

ECOWAS’s insistence on a quick resolution through any means possible is somewhat understandable, especially as reports suggest that Bazoum’s health is failing and he is living in very terrible conditions today, denied medical attention.

However, some pundits say the focus on Bazoum’s health condition above and beyond the needs of over 23 million Nigerièns suggests that the race to topple the regime in Niamey undermines the need to evaluate the circumstances that triggered a military takeover.

ECOWAS member states have not hidden the fact that their actions against the military junta are driven by a presumption of guilt, rather than a consideration of motives. This creates a challenge from the onset.

For a start, the refusal to acknowledge that the mass rallies in support of the administration may indicate that the coup addresses a festering social problem implies to Nigerièns and citizens across the region that the intention of the regional body may be more subversive than altruistic.

It is also not very diplomatic to throw the stick before the carrot, as ECOWAS appears to have done in this situation, one analyst says. Regardless of the organisation’s stance on the primacy of democratic governance over any other forms, it is also clear on the fact that its position on internal state politics is one of neutrality and respect for the use of internal mechanisms to resolve political issues within sovereign boundaries.

A different scenario from Previous interventions

The activation of military force, which ECOWAS mentions as a tool that has been applied in several instances in the past, is meant to reinstate order and not to impose governance systems. Besides, the precedents that have been mentioned show different circumstances from the situation in Niger. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the organisation invoked a new order that gave it special authorisation, backed by the United Nations Article Seven, to intervene in situations that were recognised as major humanitarian crises.

The intervention by Nigeria’s military leader at the time, General Sanni Abacha, to restore constitutional governance in Sierra Leone in 1997 was a result of the Nigerian leader’s consideration of that military junta as an extension of the ruthless Rebel United Front’s (RUF) brutal assault on the country’s population and it felt the intervention fell within the mandate of a restoration of order under the terms of the ECOWAS military intervention protocol.

In Gambia, the justification for a military intervention is the obvious public disenchantment with Yahaya Jammeh’s unpopular decision to hold on to a non-existent mandate. Even with such a pretext, an intervention would not have been possible without the tacit support of the country’s armed forces, says Stephen Adewale, Director of Africa Dialogue Mission.

Most reports out of Niger Republic suggest there is widespread support for the coup. There have been no reports of the use of military force against the people, neither are there reports of mass persecution of ethnic, religious or regional groups. The coup, by and large, was bloodless. What this explains is that there are no underlying social challenges that would require the urgent need for military action against that country.

As the Nigerian president, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, has stressed, the need for continued dialogue to address the impasse remains the only feasible path for now. This is especially true for Nigeria, a country that has one of the longest land borders and a strong cultural affinity with Niger Republic, and the one that would most likely take the brunt of social repercussions caused by a conflict.

Nigeria and Niger are also allies in a long drawn conflict with Jihadist insurgents whose attempts to push further south of the region have been curtailed by the efforts of the two countries, including Cameroon and Tchad Republic, through a military alliance known as the Multi- National Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

A conflict with the Nigerièns would clearly end Niger’s role in this alliance and create that unwanted crack in the defence that has been sustained so far. There are many political analysts who believe that these non-state forces would overrun parts of Niger and break through the ranks of the region’s armed forces if a military intervention is carried out by ECOWAS.

Why the rush to intervene?

ECOWAS has been accused of being a puppet on the strings of western powers, but this does not completely represent the motives driving the organisation’s decision. It is noteworthy that within these member-states, especially the Francophone sates, these coups have heightened fears of an imminent threat to the stability of their own establishments.

The president of Cote D’Ivoire, Alassan Ouattara, who has been one of the champions of the military option to return Bazoum to power, knows too well the implications of a civilian government functioning beside a disgruntled military. As a matter of fact, On 24 December, 1999, when the military ousted his arch rival, President Henri Konan-Bédié, Quattara hailed Bédié’s sack, describing what the soldiers did as “not a coup d’état (but) a revolution supported by all the Ivorian people”.

The Senegalese president, Macky Sall, has also been a rallying voice behind military intervention for obvious reasons as well. Senegal is currently grappling with public protests over Sall’s government’s treatment of the country’s main opposition candidate, Ousmane Sonko. Sentenced to two years over ambiguous charges, Sonko has become a symbol of the growing disenchantment with leaders across Francophone states who continue to stifle opposition to their rule.

The president of Togo, Faure Gnassingbe, understands the serious political undertones stirred by mass protests and how fragile government control becomes under those circumstances. He also understands the intricacies involved in building legitimacy through military prerogative. He has been president of Togo since 2005 – strongly backed by a military elite established by his father, Gnassingbe Eyadema, who became president of Togo through a military coup and ruled for 38 years.

For these leaders, any situation that could provoke similar political tremors within their political realms is not welcome. Their struggle for self-preservation does not, however, exonerate western powers who maintain strong relationships with these leaders and help to keep them in power as defenders of western interests.

As war drums echo throughout West Africa, Mali’s prime minister has appealed directly to the leaders of Senegal and Ivory Coast to reassess their relationships with foreign powers pushing for a military resolution to the ‘crisis’ in Niger.

The internal rivalries.

The military junta in Niger has claimed that its actions were necessary as a result of the declining security and economic challenges the country was going through and the failure of the democratic government of Mohamed Bazoum to address these challenges.

There are no doubts that the rise in insecurity and declining economic prospects created a volatile political situation in the country. However, the military hinging its intervention on challenges that appear to be prevalent across the region, and that can only be addressed by social and economic initiatives, seems a bit farfetched.

There would have been a lot more simmering beneath the surface in the country, as even the coup leader, General Abdurahmane Omar Tchiani, admits. According to him, the coup was well intended, as it was meant to stave off an imminent threat that would have affected not only Niger Republic but also Nigeria, although he is very short on details.

There were other festering issues, according to several reports. Beyond the facade that democracy presents with its principle of numerical supremacy, there are underlying issues drawn along ethnic and regional fault-lines. In Niger, Bazoum’s ethnicity may have been a factor.

The Arab minority has always been labelled as having foreign origins and this stirred strong opposition against him in the 2021 elections. His winning was largely hinged on the power of incumbency that his party enjoyed.

Many say his emergence did not sit well within the military circle, which is predominantly composed of the larger ethnic groups. Those who know how politics work in Niger say there is a lot of emphasis on the ethnic composition of its military hierarchy. Bazoum’s predecessor, Mahamadou Issoufou’s grasp of this reality helped him navigate his two terms as president.

Besides the ethnic and religious contours, public discontent with Bazoum’s ruling party, the PNDS Taraya, was already growing as a result of the tough economic realities and a general belief that partisan politics had shielded many of its supporters from prosecution for various allegations of corruption.

One major case that shines light on how deep the crevices ran on the issue of corruption was the report of a confidential audit from Niger’s ministry of defence that alleged up to $120 million in defence spending had disappeared from the West African country over an eight-year period under the PNDS Taraya, when president Issoufou was in office, ending in 2019. The funds often went into tax havens and bank accounts controlled by unknown owners.

At the center of the arms deal were two Nigerièn businessmen who acted as intermediaries in the deals: a well-known arms dealer, Aboubacar Hima, and Aboubacar Charfo, a construction contractor with no previous experience in the defense sector.

Both men, Hima and Chafo, were said to have close links with the ruling party and were never called to answer for their roles in the transactions as they maintained cordial relationships with members of the government, even under Bazoum’s leadership.

It was not so much the political bickering that emerged from the reports that rattled the public but more the fact that the Nigerièn government at the time had doled out such huge funds to individuals for equipment that had either not been delivered or were faulty, while the country counted swelling casualties from persistent insurgent attacks.

Many are asking if the coup was carried out in collusion with some elements within the government to stop a possible probe by Bazoum into the role of other actors in the contract, or if it was a pre-emptive move by the military to stop the government from giving immunity to its party members and supporters who were fingered by the probe.

The focus so far seems to have been on the military echoing the demands by the Nigerièn public for a break in relations with France, and so intuitively suggesting that, on the issue of the probe, the military stood on the side of the Nigerièn masses to stop immunity for party members. The truth is anyone’s guess.The silent opposition.

The silent opposition.

There are other realities that have not been well explored in reports coming out of Niger, and which may justify ECOWAS’s position. One is the likelihood that the support for the military may not be all that it is made out to be. For example, the protests in the capital, Niamey, imply that the military coup enjoys the support of a significant part of the Nigerièn population, but Niamey only holds about 5% of the country’s total population. That leaves a significant portion of the population whose sentiments have been almost completely blocked out by the media.

The opposition to the coup has been silent for obvious reasons, and for a government that rode to power on a 56% lead at the polls, there are bound to be large numbers of supporters, not only from the president’s political stronghold of Diffa, but other regions outside the Niamey, a city where he never really enjoyed majority support in the first place.

However, some political watchers say that if there is a considerable opposition to the coup, they would be emboldened by their numbers and would not be so silent.

Signs of the cold War dynamics.

Across the Sahelian states, the Russian flag has become a symbol of liberation and no one is sure how this happened. The growing rallies in Niger calling for stronger alliance with Russia, since the Bazoum government was toppled, with chants of “long live Putin,” “long live Russia” and “a bas la France” (down with France), seem to be the ripple effects of a growing public discontent over the failure of the democratic governments in the Sahel and their Foreign allies to eliminate the Jihadist threat and build strong economies.

It is hard to tell if these reasons cover the full spectrum of opinions that have driven this pro-Russian sentiment but it is possible. Experts on the Sahel point to growing unease with the unequal access to wealth in these states that are already struggling at the bottom of the global economic scale. The average GDP per capita is below 300 U.S. dollars. In Niger, 82% of the population have no electricity and 16% of the population are food insecure, even as the country holds the title as one of the world’s major producers of uranium, iron ore and gold.

These pro-Russia rallies, however, seem to be playing into the hands of a greater geopolitical conflict, the consequences of which Nigerièns do not seem to be fully aware. Russia’s presence is also driven by the demand for spheres of influence, and its private military company, PMC Wagner, seems to be cashing in on the growing call for a break from the usual suspects like France and the United States.

The recent protests against France in the Sahel has its underlying reasons. With its strong military presence and huge mining concerns in a country that barely feels the impact of these investments, France has clearly overstayed its welcome, and across the Sahel the long held post-colonial concept of “France Afrique” is fading.

There is an obvious wind of change that is driven by an awareness that a new multipolar world provides ready alternatives and the knowledge that Africa is once again in demand. The cocktail of foreign economic and geostrategic interests in Niger remains a major motivation for the level of global involvement in the country’s current political crisis.

For France, the possible exit from its former strongholds are too compelling. On the one hand is the reality of the loss of a strategic source of uranium and potential conduit of an alternative source of Russian gas staring France and the European Union (EU) in the face- the Nigerian AKK gas project, intended as an alternative source of gas for the Europe, passes through Niger. On the other is the possible end of its military presence in the country.

Same goes for the United States (U.S), which maintains what has been described as its largest drone base anywhere, a 110 million dollars investment that houses about 1000 U.S military personnel.

The role played by the Nigerièn political class in this scramble for the country’s geostrategic advantage gives some insight into what drives the internal power play. For example, in 2022, when France and other European allies withdrew their forces from neighbouring Mali. Bazoum was quick to invite them to Niger.

This willingness to work so strongly with the French has been a source of opposition to Bazoum and his government for some time, and the opposition has also been extended to his ethnic group, the Ouled Slimane, who, many in Niger have described as allies of the French.

The Nigerièn military leadership and many influential individuals in the country denounced the increase in foreign forces, but Bazoum’s government did not shift its position.

The armed forces in most of the Sahel states have had to deal with this gradual loss of relevance and resulting effect of a weakness in their roles as sovereign military entities. The calls on foreign military forces to leave their territories reveal the importance that the military juntas place on the need to win back sovereignty and national validation.

As Nigerièns await a final decision by ECOWAS on what the next step of action will be, they seem to be boldly egging on the military junta in its attempt to create a new political reality that excludes the former global actors on their soil while they seek alternative relationships.

However, the realpolitik that has shaped the current situation in the country will not be easily dismantled, even if it would be ideal to allow the Nigerièn population chart its own course in the search for a resolution to its internal political challenges and true sovereignty.