The Hornet’s Nest
On an October day in 1961, after closing hours, several people came together in one of the shops near the railway station in Lome. When they came to the door of the shop they looked around them nervously. Everything went on as in a classical detective story. There was the special knock on the door, the password and even several masks. However, no masks could conceal from the citizens of Lome the too familiar figures of Togo’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Teophil Mally, and the Commissar of Police of the city of Lome, C. Dekon.
It was more difficult to identify the man with typical Anglo-Saxon features. But the name of Leonard Desimus meant absolutely nothing to anyone who did not know that it was an alias of George Davis, representative of one of the most powerful western intelligence services. It was this man who declared the meeting of the conspirators open.
Gbedemah briefed the participants on that clandestine meeting on the situation in Ghana. He said among other things that in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and other cities, especially in the north of the country, there are persons dissatisfied with Nkrumah’s socialism and prepared to take very decisive steps against it. In this way the Americans thought to remove Gbedemah’s rival at the last moment. Happy days had begun for Gbedemah.
The British began to show more interest in their “graduate”, hatching plans similar to the Continued American ones with the only difference that London was preparing Busia for the role of the future dictator, while Gbedemah was to be used for the cloak and dagger and then put on trial as an assassin. Thus, American dollars and British pounds sterling started flowing with renewed force into Gbedemah’s pockets. He opened personal accounts in several banks in Geneva, Zurich and Basel. He bought a villa in Nice for one of his mistresses, Dossea Kissey, and occasionally visited her there.
The lust for money in Gbedemah took the upper hand over fear or qualms of conscience. Putting with one hand the pounds sterling and with the other the American dollars into his pockets to pay the services of the terrorists and buy weapons for them, he meted our spurious banknotes for various other services, leaving the hard currency in his own bank accounts.
By the summer of 1962 the conspirators managed to complete a big part of their work. It was reported from Accra that everything was ready for the assassination of Dr. Nkrumah. K. Dekon, Lome’s Police Commissar early that year shipped over the border a large consignment of leaflets, weapons and explosives. Several hundred plastic bombs were bought in Paris and shipped over to Lome. Gbedemah’s cousin Adjavon had a real military depot in his house in Lome which could probably compete in size with the national arsenals of Togo.
While visiting Hamburg in June, 1962, Gbedemah received 20,000 Ghanaian pounds from an American representative and another 50,000 from London. Later on the U.S. Ambassador in Lome gave him another 50,000 as well as a special ” manual ” on the organisation of coup d’elat, as well as weapons. Out of the 120,000 pounds Gbedemah paid 5,000 to the Ghanaian exile Salifu Imoro, a participant of the plot. And that he did only because it was in the house of Imoro in Lome the address of which is B.P. 20, that the above- mentioned George Davis had lived and who was not supposed to have even the remotest suspicions that Gbedemah was pocketing the money given to him.
The attempt on Nkrumah’s life was fixed for August 1st, during his trip to the village of Kulun- gugu on the border with the Republic of Upper Volta. It is common knowledge that the assassins fired and missed. The arrests that followed dealt a heavy blow to Gbedemah’s organisation although at that time very few people knew that it was Gbedemah himself who was in the centre of the conspiracy.
Black Magic
The failure shook Gbedemah so much that he immediately left for Cotonou to see Bongu Azevodu, the witch-doctor, and almost in tears. implored the latter to sell him the magic ” juju ” which would help him kill Nkrumah and become President of Ghana. The incantations of the witch- doctor instilled new energy in Gbedemah. From him he flew to London, then to Lagos, again to Lome and back to Lagos. He wrote letters by the score to Busia and other leaders of the United Party, bought explosive, hand-grenades and revolvers, wrote leaflets and anonymous threats to Nkrumah and his assistants.
Three days, on September 9th, 20th and 22nd, shots and explosions shook Accra again. Gbedemah’s henchmen crept out of their den. But the people were keeping day and night vigil on Nkrumah. Black magic proved impotent. On September 29, Gbedemah circulated the “open letter” in which remembering his role of the “voluntary political exile” he presented his “political credo”. Out of Gbedemah’s entangled philosophizing one thing stood out cearly; the necessity of flinging the doors of Ghana wide open to foreign business. Having in mind Nkrumah’s statements against U.S. interference in African affairs Gbedemah reproached Nkrumah for being impolite to imperialism. He strongly disliked Ghana’s seven-year development plan in which, in his opinion, too much attention was focused on the organisation of state control.
While hypocritically offering his sympathy to Nkrumah in connection with the attempt on the latter’s life, Gbedemah in fact justified this attempt as an extreme step taken because of the absence of other opportunities. Written in a state of a nervous breakdown after the unsuccessful terroristic actions, this letter produced an extremely unfavourable impression both in London and Washington. Mr. Davis conveyed to Gbedemah the opinion of his superiors to the effect that Gbedemah was no better writer than marksman.
Indeed, apart from the politely-worded invective addressed to Nkrumah and his policy, the letter has no constructive proposals.’ Gbedemah even failed to learn the terminology used by his masters who no longer attempt to attack openly the ideals of socialism, economic development and African unity so popular on the continent. The letter demonstrated clearly that Gbedemah had no programme for Ghana’s further development of his own but rather was guided in his actions by the desire to compromise Nkrumah and the achievements of the Ghanaian people.
The letter was written at a time when a new attempt on Nkrumah’s life was being prepared under the guidance of Gbedemah. In early November, the customs officials at Lome Airport found a large amount of explosives and weapons in the suitcases of one Mr. Richardson. It was Busia himself who rushed to the scene to save the luggage. He was accompanied by Togo’s Minister of Interior Teophil Mally.
The suitcases were carried from the airport directly to the Ghana border and handed over to the chief of a tribe in the village of Avorga Baja. On November 6, a new attempt was made on the Ghanaian President’s life but the assassins missed again. Gbedemah lost all confidence in the ” juju ” and showered curses on the unfortunate witch- doctor’ Bongu Azevodu. London cut down Gbedemah’s monthly pay.
The Intimidation Tactics
In late November, Gbedemah’s personal messenger, Yaw Manu, assigned to him as was later found out by the ubiquitous Mr. D. Davis, brought a letter to Gbedemah from Busia which invited him to attend a secret meeting in Lagos. In his letter Busia warned Gbedemah that the meeting would be extremely important and even decisive. The meeting in the capital of Nigeria was attended by numerous Ghanaian exiles. But not only by them. There were also non-Africans amongst them. The question was raised in the following manner: enough of that shooting from behind corners. Forces should be rallied to organise the Ghanaian opposition and exiles and start real operations.
The proposed plan envisaged a number of measures including the tactics of intimidation of the Ghanaian population. It was suggested that the Ghanaians be persuaded that the opposition to Nkrumah’s Government acts not only from without but that it is also powerful within the country and that the dissatisfaction with Nkrumah’s policies has indeed spread throughout the entire population of the country.
With this end in view it was planned to set off a number of explosions at meetings and rallies thus creating an atmosphere of nervous tension and fear of the power of the opposition. The Tsevi camp in Togo became the centre of military training. Some non-commissioned officers and soldiers who served in the Congo and had been recruited by the Americans were to be used as instructors. Busia was responsible for propa- ganda in preparing the coup d’etat. Gbedemah headed all terroristic operations.
