The recent downing of a Malian drone by Algerian forces near Tinzaouatène on April 1, has escalated tensions between Mali and Algeria, raising serious questions about Algeria’s motives that led to the incident. The drone, a Turkish-made Baykar Akıncı, was reportedly engaged in an intelligence mission targeting Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a jihadist group linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Algeria claimed the interception was in response to a violation of its airspace, but Malian authorities and regional analysts argue that the timing suggests a deliberate attempt to shield Ag Ghali from capture.
Malian security sources say the intercepted drone was conducting surveillance on a gathering of JNIM leaders, including Iyad Ag Ghali, near Tinzaouatène, a border region notorious for terrorist activity. The mission was part of Mali’s intensified counterterrorism efforts following its acquisition of advanced Turkish drones in 2024.
Algeria claimed the drone violated its airspace but it provided no concrete evidence. This explanation has been met with scepticism, as the same type of drone had previously operated in the area without incident. As AES INFO, an online account on X, which reports on events in the three Sahel states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, noted, “This same type of Turkish drone Baykar Akıncı, acquired by Mali in 2024, regularly flies over the region without incident. The coincidence is disturbing: why an interception that day, when a crucial operation targeting Ag Ghali was underway?”
The timing suggests Algeria may have acted to prevent Ag Ghali’s capture, reinforcing long-standing suspicions of covert support for the terrorist leader, some security analysts in the Sahel have said.
There is a historical context to these allegations. Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg militant from Mali’s Kidal region, has been a central figure in Sahelian conflicts since the 1980s. After transitioning from secular Tuareg nationalism to jihadism in the 2010s, he founded Ansar Dine and later JNIM, aligning with AQIM. Multiple sources suggest that Ag Ghali’s operations had links to Algerian intelligence. Jeremy Keenan, a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), in his writings and interviews, has suggested that Ag Ghali’s activities, including his leadership of Ansar Dine, aligned with Algerian intelligence interests, allowing Algeria to project influence in Mali.
This claim is supported by a 2012 Clingendael Institute report, which notes that Ag Ghali’s group, Ansar Dine, leveraged alliances with AQIM, which had established cross-border networks for arms and fighters, potentially aiding mobility and evasion. Similarly, his historical ties to regional actors, including past negotiations with Algerian authorities, such as the 2003 hostage releases, imply a network that could facilitate safe havens or intelligence
Some sources, like a 2013 article in Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, note Ag Ghali’s historical interactions with Algerian authorities, such as his role in negotiating the 1991 Tamanrasset Accords and reported meetings with Algerian intelligence during the 2012 Mali crisis. It also mentions unconfirmed claims, like Ag Ghali receiving medical treatment in Algiers in 2012, suggesting familiarity with Algerian officials. If true, security analysts in the Sahel suggest this would explain Ag Ghali’s continued survival despite being a high-priority target for Mali and international forces.
Several sources in the Sahel say Algeria presents itself as a key counterterrorism actor in the region, yet its actions raise doubts. They question why the government was silent in December 2023, when Malian forces conducted a drone strike in Tinzaouatène, which killed several individuals, including a prominent figure named Colonel Hassan Ag Fagaga, a notable Tuareg rebel leader associated with the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-PSD). They say this selective intervention suggests Algeria may prioritise protecting certain jihadist figures to maintain leverage in regional instability.
The incident has heightened mistrust between Mali and Algeria. On April 6, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, simultaneously withdrew their ambassadors from Algeria in a coordinated protest. This move signals growing frustration with Algeria’s perceived obstruction of counterterrorism efforts.
Under Colonel Assimi Goïta’s junta, Mali has pursued an aggressive counterterrorism strategy, partnering with Russia and acquiring advanced weaponry, including Turkish drones. The country, despite the security challenges, continues to show resilience and determination in its fight against terrorist groups threatening its stability and that of the Sahel region. Security experts insist that, without genuine cooperation from neighbors like Algeria, long-term stability remains elusive.
The downing of the Malian drone was not an isolated incident but a reflection of deeper geopolitical tensions. The claim by Malian sources that Algeria’s intervention in the Malian operation exposes long-standing ties between Algerian intelligence and jihadist leaders may not be correct, but it reinforces predictions that tensions between Algeria and Mali would only intensify the Sahel’s security crisis, benefiting terrorist groups like JNIM and their enablers.
